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In his 1984 State of the Union message, President Ronald Reagan
gave Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan the following mandate:
Let us go forward with an historic reform for fairness, simplicity and
incentives for growth. I am asking Secretary Don Regan for a plan for
action to simplify the entire tax code so all taxpayers, big and small, are
treated more fairly.... I have asked that specific recommendations, con-
sistent with those objectives, be presented to me by December 1984.
During the following ten months the Office of Tax Policy at the Treasury
Department worked to fulfill that mandate, and Regan issued its report
to the President, entitled Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic
Growth (hereafter Treasury I), in late November.
Academic economists and lawyers specializing in the study of tax-
ation, whether liberal or conservative, were virtually unanimous in their
praise of the general contours of the Treasury report; they expressed
little doubt that the reforms proposed would go far in satisfying the
objectives set out by the President and give the country a much im-
proved tax system. But the outcry that arose from other quarters indicat-
ed clearly that the enthusiasm for Treasury I was far from universal. Six
more months elapsed before the new Secretary of the Treasury James
Baker obtained Reagan’s approval of a much watered-down report enti-
tled The President’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and
Simplicity.
This paper describes the rationale underlying the tax reform propos-
als of Treasury I. The first section outlines the need for tax reform and
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the second the basic structure of the reforms proposed in Treasury I. The
third section comments briefly on options not followed and the fourth
section provides greater detail on the reasoning underlying some of the
major reforms and discusses some of the changes made between Trea-
sury I and the President’s proposals. The final section provides some
concluding observations on the two sets of proposals.
The Need for Tax Reform
Under current law a given amount of income can be taxed very
differently, depending on how it is earned and how it is spent. Most
cash wages are taxed, but most fringe benefits are not. Interest income
on bank accounts is taxed, but that on life insurance policies and state
and local bonds is not. Rental income is taxed, but the imputed income
on owner-occupied homes is not; even so, interest on mortgage interest
is fully deductible by the homeowner. Capital gains are taxed at prefer-
ential rates and only when realized--or not at all, when appreciated
property is transferred at death. The investment tax credit and acceler-
ated depreciation produce ex ante marginal effective tax rates on income
from new investments that vary widely across assets and industries, but
are generally far below statutory rates and even negative for some equip-
ment. On the other hand, one particular form of income, that from
corporate equity investment, is subject to double taxation, first at the
corporate level and again when distributed to shareholders.
Moreover, the U.S. income tax is highly vulnerable to inflation.
Fictitious capital gains are taxed, the real value of depreciation
allowances depends on the rate of inflation, effective tax rates on real
interest income have recently been far above the statutory rate and can
easily exceed 100 percent, and the after-tax cost of borrowing can easily
be negative. Not only does taxation vary across types of investments, it
does so in ways that depend capriciously on the rate of inflation.
These differences in the way various sources and uses of income are
taxed create several undesirable effects. Most obviously, it is simply not
fair that the income tax paid by families with a given amount of income
should vary so greatly, just because of the source and use of the income.
Horizontal equity demands that two families with the same income
should pay roughly the same amount of income tax.
The current tax system also distorts the allocation of economic re-
sources. Fringe benefits--and consumption that can most easily be tak-
en in the form of fringe benefits--are artificially favored over cash
wages. Tax-preferred investment vehicles and investment opportunities
are favored over fully taxed ones, resulting in misallocation of funds
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relative to other forms of consumption and investment. The allocation of
capital within the business sector is distorted by various tax preferences.
Tax preferences, the favorable treatment of capital gains, and the deduct-
ibility of interest expense can be combined to create tax shelters that
result in allocation of capital to unproductive investments, as well as
undermining equity and the perception of fairness. Use of the corporate
form--and production that must be undertaken in that form of business
organization--is discouraged. The dependence of effective tax rates on
the rate of inflation creates uncertainty, as well as encouraging borrow-
ing, discouraging saving, and creating distortions in investment
patterns.
Some of the distortions inherent in current law are the result of
explicit policy decisions; others are better characterized as accidental. In
any event, Treasury I was based on a belief that resource allocation will,
by and large, be better if the tax system is neutral in its impact on
economic decisions and is not used to implement social and industrial
policy.
On balance, much more income escapes the tax collector’s net than
is caught twice--or once, where no real income exists. As a result, mar-
ginal tax rates are substantially higher than would be required if all
income were taxed uniformly and consistently. The high rates accentu-
ate any non-neutralities and inequities in the tax system, as well as
discouraging work effort, saving, investment, invention, innovation,
risk-taking, and so forth.
The current tax system is complex and it causes complexity. To some
extent complexity is unavoidable in the income tax law of a complex
economy. But to a large degree the tax system is needlessly complex
because it is used to further so many nonfiscal objectives. Moreover, it is
useful to distinguish between complexity in tax forms, instructions, and
recordkeeping, on the one hand, and a more pernicious form of com-
plexity. Tax preferences create complexity in the form of opportunities
for tax planning and the distortion of business decisions, and these, in
turn, create complexity of the first type. In a world without tax prefer-
ences, business decisions could be based on business considerations,
without regard for tax considerations, there would be little need for tax
planning, and tax compliance and administration could be simpler.
A final concern motivating the proposals of Treasury I was the grow-
ing perception that the tax system is unfair. To some extent, this percep-
tion is based simply on the recognition that tax burdens at given income
levels do vary dramatically and that many high-income individuals are
not paying their fair share of taxes. But this perception seems to be
manifested often in the seemingly puzzling demand for "tax simplifica-
tion," rather than "tax reform." In fact, tax simplification may actually
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are not necessarily just saying that their own taxes are too complicated
when they cry for simplification, though that sentiment is widespread.
Rather, they appear to want simplification for others, in order to reduce
the opportunities for others to take advantage of tax-reducing gimmicks.
The perception of unfairness provides an important reason not to
implement social and industrial policy through the tax system, even if
such policy makes good sense. Since the beginning of the republic gov-
ernments have spent money in ways that some have questioned. While
this may have made many think their tax dollars were being wasted, it
did not throw the tax system itself into disrepute. Tax expenditures, the
use of tax breaks to achieve nonfiscal objectives, have quite different and
more pernicious effects, for they create the kind of horizontal inequi-
ties-not to mention vertical ones--that undermine taxpayer morale, a
most precious commodity in a system based on voluntary compliance.
In summary, then, the proposals of Treasury I were based on a
concern for horizontal equity among similarly situated taxpayers, for
neutrality in the allocation of economic resources, for lower tax rates and
greater economic incentives, for simplification, especially where oppor-
tunities for tax planning are concerned, and for the perception that the
tax system is fair. It was expected that a more neutral tax system and
lower marginal rates would be more conducive to economic progress.
The President’s proposals, by comparison, contain a much less compre-
hensive definition of real economic income and more explicitly favor
capital formation and innovation, at some cost in terms of equity, neu-
trality, and simplification.
The Broad Contours of Treasury I
The overriding objective 0f Treasury I was to tax, as nearly as possi-
ble, all real economic income more uniformly and consistently and at low-
er rates. The discussion of the three italicized words, which are key to
the proposals, can be brief, given the discussion of the previous section.
All income must be taxed, if the tax system is to be fair, economical-
ly neutral, and simple, in the sense of avoiding opportunities for tax
planning. But no income should be taxed twice, as corporate equity
income distributed as dividends now is. Nor should fictitious income be
taxed, be it nominal capital gains or the inflation premium in interest
income. Conversely, deduction should not be allowed for the inflation
component of interest expense. Inflation adjustment should also be
made in the calculation of depreciation allowances and the cost of goods
sold from inventory. Without these adjustments, the income tax will not
be based on real income and it will not be fair or neutral.
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be fair and neutral. This rule has many ramifications. First, fringe bene-
fits should be taxed, as well as cash compensation. Second, income
should be recognized for tax purposes when earned, rather than merely
when received; if that cannot be fully achieved, the timing of deductions
for expenses should at least match that of the income the expenses pro-
duce. Third, depreciation, depletion, amortization, and other deduc-
tions for expenses associated with wasting assets should, to the extent
possible, track the decline in value of such assets.
A further objective of Treasury I was to increase the tax threshold by
enough to approximate the official poverty level, and thereby eliminate
tax liability on families living in poverty. 1 This was to be done primarily
through an increase in the personal exemption; however, the earned
income tax credit would be indexed and the zero bracket amount (ZBA)
would be increased, especially for heads-of-households, those single
persons who support dependent relatives.
A change in the overall progressivity of the tax system was not an
objective of Treasury I. Raising the tax threshold would, of course, in-
crease the progressivity of the tax system in the very lowest income
brackets. But beyond the point at which this effect phases out, the Trea-
sury I proposals would be distributionally neutral.2 Whereas on average
the reduction in individual income tax would be 8.5 percent, the reduc-
tion for the brackets above $20,000 would lie in the narrow range of 6.4
to 9.3 percent. Of course, within these income brackets there would be
substantial redistribution of tax burdens. For example, in all income
classes above $15,000 per year, more than 60 percent of all families
would experience a tax decrease. But substantial numbers--20 to 36
percent of families in the various income classes--would experience tax
increases. Particularly interesting is the fact that in the two income
classes above $100,000 per year more than 15 percent of taxpayers would
have tax increases in excess of 2 percent of income. By comparison, in
those same two income classes, 27 percent (for the $100,000 to $200,000
class) and 49 percent (for those with incomes above $200,000) would
have tax decreases in excess of 2 percent of income. This is a clear mani-
festation of the fundamental proposition underlying Treasury I: under
current law different sources and uses of income--and therefore families
with similar incomes--are taxed very differently.
1The "25 percent" rate reduction enacted as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 shifted the rate schedule down; thus it provided no relief for those at the bottom of the
income scale who had been hurt most by the bracket creep of the 1970s that had, in real
terms, shifted the rate schedule to the left. Treasury I and the President’s proposals would
shift the schedule to the fight, thereby removing poverty-level families from the tax rolls.
2Figures on distributional effects cited in this paper refer to family economic income,
as used in Treasury I and described therein. See U.S. Treasury Department (1984, Volume
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Treasury I contained a substantial shift of tax burdens from individ-
uals to corporations. To some extent this was the result of a political
calculation: if the proposals were revenue neutral for corporations and
for individuals, considered separately, there would be about as many
losers as winners among individuals, and therefore little popular sup-
port for reform. But there was also an important economic reason for the
shift: the fear that the gap between a corporate rate of 28 percent and a
top personal rate of 37 percent would be great enough to induce taxpay-
ers to use artificial business structures to avoid tax.3 Of course, the in-
crease in corporate taxes may have done as much to create opposition--
especially highly vocal opposition--as was gained by the shift of revenues.
Options Not Followed
An understanding of the rationale for not proposing certain things
in Treasury I may be as important as understanding why certain provi-
sions were proposed. This section discusses three of these: the choice of
income rather than personal consumption as the tax base; the rejection
of a value-added tax; and the tax treatment of housing under the income
tax.
Taxing Personal Consumption
Many observers believe that it would be desirable to shift reliance
from income taxation toward the taxation of consumption. This can be
achieved in at least three more or less distinct ways. The first of these
would be to substitute a full-fledged personal cash-flow tax for the in-
come tax. The second would be to impose a value-added tax (VAT) or
other form of sales tax, and the third would be to use ad hoc approaches
to favor saving and/or investment under the income tax. Unfortunately,
the relative advantages of the three approaches seem to lie in inverse
order to their likelihood of being employed.
Recent years have seen the development of considerable academic
support for a personalized tax based on consumption, rather than in-
come. Many proponents of a tax on consumed income, especially econo-
mists, emphasize intertemporal neutrality in the choice of when to
consume and equity defined in terms of lifetime endowments. Probably
more important than these are the considerable administrative advan-
tages of a consumption tax based on cash flow. Questions of the timing
of recognition of income do not arise, because the tax is based on cash
flow. Similarly, inflation adjustments are not necessary in the measure-
3Simple aesthetics also played a part in the choice; a rate structure for individual
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ment of income (though they are needed for bracket limits and other
figures fixed in nominal terms), since cash flow inherently occurs in
dollars of the current period.
Despite these manifest advantages--which are highlighted by the
complexity of the Treasury I proposals for inflation adjustment and the
time value of money--the tax on consumed income was not proposed,
in part because the technical experts at the Treasury Department were
not convinced that by December 1 they could solve all the problems it
might entail. With severely limited staff resources and a tight deadline, it
would be impossible to proceed very long on a dual track to develop
detailed proposals for both a comprehensive income tax along tradition-
al lines and a novel tax on consumed income. Thus it was necessary to
be confident early in the tax-reform process that there were no "show-
stoppers’--problems that could not be solved--if all staff resources
were to be devoted to the tax on consumed income. For better or worse,
that confidence did not exist. Among the potential showstoppers were
the following: transition, international issues, and the treatment of
bequests.4
The current income tax involves payment of tax as income is
earned, with tax-free consumption or bequest. A tax on consumed in-
come, by comparison, involves no payment of tax as income is earned,
as long as income is saved, but taxation at the time of consumption; the
treatment of bequests is a controversial issue to be discussed below. The
transition problem derives from the fact that it would not be fair--or
politically feasible--to levy the personal consumption tax on retirement
consumption out of savings accumulated under an income tax. Nor
would it be a simple matter to formulate a workable transition provi-
sion-which might need to be in effect for several decades--that would
exempt consumption from the preexisting after-tax savings of most tax-
payers of middle age or older, but without exempting all such wealth, no
matter what its size.
International issues take at least two forms: international tax rela-
tions and tax evasion. A switch to a tax on consumed income would
necessitate renegotiating all foreign tax treaties now in effect. No other
country has a tax on consumed income. How to mesh a tax on con-
sumed income with the income taxes of other countries is far from obvi-
ous. Nor could the process of renegotiating tax treaties be concluded
quickly. It is useful to note that neither Sweden nor the United King-
dom, both of which have been studying the consumed-income tax for
roughly a decade, has yet adopted such a tax.
Under an income tax,-.evasion involves mischaracterization or hid-
4For a somewhat more detailed description of the problems posed by constraints on
staff and time, see McLure (1985a). See U.S. Treasury Department (1984, Volume 1, Chap-
ter 9) for a more detailed discussion of the potential "showstoppers."36 Charles E. McLure, Jr.
ing of income flows. By comparison, under a tax on consumed income,
tax can be evaded if saving can be documented artificially. It appeared
that international capital flows provided unacceptable opportunities for
this type of fraudulent behavior. (For example, funds borrowed abroad,
but not reported, could be brought into the United States as "saving."s)
One particularly attractive version of a cash-flow tax is based on the
desire to tax lifetime income endowments in a way that does not depend
on when during the taxpayer’s life income is earned and when it is
spent.6 Under this version, bequests would be included in taxable con-
sumption of the decedent as well as being part of the endowment of the
heir. Such a tax could easily be as progressive as the current income and
transfer taxes, even if levied at relatively low rates.
Under a very different view, the cash-flow tax would not apply to
bequests; rather, its base would be only consumption. The existing dis-
tribution of taxes by income class could be achieved, if at all, only by
levying extremely high marginal rates on consumption--rates that are
unlikely to be enacted. Under this approach, the tax liabilities of wealthy
families would exceed those of upper middle-income families only to the
extent of differences in levels of consumption. Dynasties would be per-
petuated and inequalities in the distribution of income would grow. The
defects of this second approach and the uncertainty of how bequests
might ultimately be treated makes one pause before proposing a tax on
cash flow.
One particular form of tax on consumption, that proposed by Hall
and Rabushka, merits special attention. Their ingenious proposal suffers
from a fundamental political drawback in addition to those just dis-
cussed: because of its flat rate, which is essential for administrative rea-
sons, it would involve a massive redistribution of tax burdens from
those at the top of the income scale to those in the middle.7
Value-Added Tax
A combination of a value-added tax (or retail sales tax) and a com-
prehensive income tax levied at lower rat~s could constitute an attractive
package. The VAT is relatively neutral, it is generally regarded as being
fair, and it avoids the tax bias against saving inherent in the income tax.
Moreover, it would take some of the pressure off the income tax, allow-
5This problem is over and above the transitional difficulty resulting from the possibil-
ity of repatriating wealth previously held offshore.
6See Aaron and Galper (1985).
7See Hall and Rabushka (1985). Hall and Rabushka (1983) indicate that at a 1979 level
of income of about $250,000, taxes would fall by almost one-third. By comparison, at an
income level of about $28,000, they would rise by about one-third. For further appraisal of
the Hall-Rabushka tax from the perspective of a value-added tax, see Carlson and McLure
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ing lower rates and making remaining distortions and inequities less
important. The income tax, on the other hand, could retain conceptual
and economic integrity, thereby avoiding the distortions and inequities
of current law.
This stands in marked contrast to the use of ad hoc incentives for
savings under the income tax. The investment tax credit and accelerated
depreciation can easily produce negative tax rates on equity income, and
the use of debt financing makes matters worse. Activities that would not
be undertaken in the absence of taxation become attractive in such a
world. Moreover, the perception of fairness and taxpayer morale suffer.
Even though an entire volume of Treasury I was devoted to the
discussion of a value-added tax and other forms of general sales tax,
such a tax was never a viable alternative. President Reagan had stated
repeatedly, and most prominently during the debates with Walter Mon-
dale, that he would consider a tax increase only as a last resort. Within
the context of revenue neutrality imposed by this promise, a value-
added tax would be admissible only as a partial replacement for the
income tax. Given the substantial administrative and compliance cost of
introducing a VAT, not to mention other considerations, this did not
seem to be a reasonable policy to propose.8
This is not to say that a value-added tax or federal retail sales tax
should not have been proposed. My own view is that the continuation
of substantial budget deficits endangers the macroeconomic health of
the entire world, as well as contributing to the strength of the dollar that
hampers the competitiveness of much of American industry. Moreover,
I doubt that the will exists to cut enough from the budget to make much
of a dent in the currently projected deficits. If we are not willing to make
those cuts, then we must reconcile ourselves to paying the taxes neces-
sary to cover our budgetary excesses--and the sooner we start, the bet-
ter. My preference would be to introduce a sales tax as soon as
possible--which may not be for several years, because of the time re-
quired to put such a system in place--using a temporary surcharge on a
greatly reformed income tax base to buy the time necessary.
The Home Mortgage Deduction
It is unfortunate--if politically inevitable--that President Reagan
was forced into removing the home mortgage deduction from the table
of tax reform. Because net imputed income on owner-occupied housing
is not subject to tax, but property taxes and mortgage interest are de-
ductible, net imputed income is, in effect, subject to a negative rate of
tax. Taxing income from other investments at a positive rate therefore
8See also U.S. Treasury Department (1984, Volume 1, Chapter 10, and Volume 3).38 Charles E. McLure, Jr.
results in the misallocation of capital toward housing. The inability to
reduce the deduction for mortgage interest means that it is absolutely
impossible to achieve a level playing field among alternative invest-
ments, except by leveling down to an effective tax rate of zero or below.
This is, in a sense, what happened in 1981 when the investment tax
credit (ITC) and the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) were em-
ployed to redress the favoritism previously shown toward housing. (Of
course, the abatement of inflation further benefited business invest-
ment, relative to owner-occupied housing.) But reducing the taxation of
business income in this way, rather than through rate reduction, has
further adverse effects. A much more satisfactory approach would be to
begin to move toward elimination of the deductibility of mortgage inter-
est, perhaps over a period of 15 to 20 years.9
The Proposals
Achieving the objective of taxing all real economic income uniform-
ly and consistently would require changing a large number of provisions
of U.S. tax law. This section describes briefly the reasons for some of the
more important and more controversial proposals of Treasury I and
(where different) the tax reform package submitted by President Reagan.
Fringe Benefits
Treasury I would have taxed many fringe benefits that are currently
tax free to the employee, but deductible by the employer. The most
important of these was the proposal to tax health benefits in excess of
$70 per month for a single person and $175 per month for a family.
Fairness, economic neutrality, and the desire for rate reduction un-
derlie the proposal to tax fringe benefits. It is not fair, for example, that
some taxpayers must pay for health care with after-tax dollars, while
others receive the same (or better) care as a tax-exempt benefit. More-
over, the tax-free status of most fringe benefits causes them to be over-
consumed, relative to other goods and services. There is little question,
for example, that much of the growth in health benefits can be traced to
their favorable tax status. Finally, of course, there is substantial revenue
in the area of fringe benefits. Taxing benefits would allow significant
reductions in marginal rates.
In principle, all health benefits should be included in a comprehen-
sive definition of taxable income. There may, however, be important
policy reasons for not going so far, as well as persuasive political rea-
9For a further discussion of this issue, see McLure (1985b).THETREASURY PROPOSALS 39
sons. There may, for example, be social benefits from employer provi-
sion of basic health insurance, and retaining tax incentives for benefits
below a ceiling can be justified as a means of forestalling demands for
national health insurance.
The Treasury I approach in the health care area represents a compro-
mise between the competing objectives of equity, neutrality, and rate
reduction, on the one hand, and the social benefits of employer-pro-
vided health insurance on the other. It would hit only the most generous
schemes, where the distorting effects of the bias in current law are most
obvious, and would, considered by itself, make the income tax more
progressive.
The approach to the taxation of fringe benefits adopted in the Presi-
dent’s proposals has little attraction beyond a modest amount of rate
reduction and the achievement of a small crack in the armor of resistance
to the taxation of fringe benefits. Only the first $10 per month of health
benefits for a single person ($25 for a family) would be taxed, and virtu-
ally all other fringe benefits would remain tax-exempt. This approach
would improve slightly equity between those taxpayers who do have
health coverage, and those who do not, but its distributional effect with-
in the covered group would be perverse. And, of course, being inframar-
ginal for most taxpayers, the approach in the President’s proposals has
almost no benefit in terms of redressing the incentives for over-utiliza-
tion of this form of compensation.
State and Local Taxes
State and local taxes are spent largely to provide services that bene-
fit those who pay the taxes. As a result, there is little more reason that
they should be deductible than there is that other (private) consumption
expenditures should be tax~preferred. The deduction implies that on
average for every dollar spent at the state and local level some 15 to 20
cents is, in effect, paid by residents of other states. This, in turn, creates
a tendency for the public sector to be over-expanded at the state and
local level.
The deduction for state and local taxes also has distributionally per~
verse effects. Both the likelihood of itemizing and the value per dollar of
itemized deductions rise with income. Moreover, though the correlation
is far from perfect, the states with the highest amounts of deductible
taxes per capita tend to have the highest levels of income.
Defenders of the deduction for state and local taxes commonly ar-
gue that many state activities have important spillovers of benefits
across jurisdictional boundaries and that much of state and local spend~
ing is for redistributional purposes. These arguments are not persuasive.
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inefficient instrument for the encouragement of the relatively small por-
tion of subnational expenditures that do have important spillovers at the
margin. Targeted grants are more appropriate for this purpose. Nor is
the distribution argument persuasive. A common tenet of the literature
on the assignment of taxes and expenditures in a federal system is that
taxes levied at the state and local level should reflect benefits of public
services, with redistribution being left to the federal government.
Nor is it compelling to argue that repeal of the deduction for state
and local taxes would cause competition among these governments.
Economists have long seen competition as the benefactor of the con-
sumer, by ensuring efficiency, cost consciousness, and consumer sover-
eignty. The same arguments can be made for competition among
governments. 10
The proposal to allow deduction for only some state and local taxes
is also not attractive. The federal government should interfere as little as
possible in the decisions of state and local governments, absent a com-
pelling reason for interference. Differentiating between state and local
taxes would induce artificially excessive reliance on the revenue sources
remaining deductible.
Charitable Contributions
The proposals of Treasury I would affect charitable contributions in
four important ways. Most important, rate reduction would lessen the
incentive for charitable giving. Beyond that, the deduction for non-
itemizers would be repealed, itemized deductions would be allowed
only for contributions in excess of 2 percent of adjusted gross income,
and deductions for gifts of appreciated property would be limited to the
taxpayer’s (inflation-adjusted) basis in.the property. President Reagan
proposed only repealing the deduction for non-itemizers, in addition to
reducing rates, but would apply the individual minimum tax to the
excess of market value over basis in the case of gifts of appreciated
property.
Contrary to much of what has been written, the authors of Treasury I
did not view charitable contributions as just another tax preference to be
eliminated in the name of fairness and neutrality. Rather, they recog-
nized explicitly the social value of allowing tax benefits for philanthropy.
There are, however, conflicting objectives in the world of tax reform.
Elimination of the deduction for non-itemizers was proposed in the
name of fairness, simplicity, and rate reduction; it was also believed that
adverse effects on giving by non-itemizers would not be significant. In
the case of the floor for itemized deductions the argument was basically
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simplicity, as well as rate reduction in the context of revenue neutrality.
For the taxpayer who could predict at the first of the year that he or she
would exceed the floor, the incentive effects would be the same at the
margin (except insofar as rates are reduced) as if there were no floor.
Incentives would be reduced for those below the floor, but taxpayer
compliance would be simplified. Finally, the argument on gifts of appre-
ciated property was one of fairness; taxpayers should not be allowed a
deduction for amounts never recognized as income.
Measurement of Capital Income
In the current income tax, measurement of income is based on his-
torical costs of assets and on nominal interest income and expense. As
noted earlier, this makes the equity and neutrality of the tax system
vulnerable to inflation because effective tax rates depend on the rate of
inflation. Moreover, during inflationary times there are political pres-
sures for ad hoc adjustments to income measurement to compensate for
the adverse effects of inflation--but not usually for the beneficial ones.
This helps explain the liberalization of the taxation of capital gains in
1978 and 1981 and the political appeal of the accelerated cost recovery
system (ACRS) and the investment tax credit (ITC) enacted in 1981.21 Of
course, when inflation abates, as it has since 1981, such compensatory
provisions can be overly generous and create further inequities and
distortions.
Inflation adjustment. Treasury I attempted to cut through this prob-
lem by providing explicit inflation adjustment for depreciation
allowances, for the cost of goods sold from inventory, for capital gains,
and for interest income and expense. With explicit allowance having
been made for inflation, there would be no need for ad hoc surrogates
for inflation adjustments. Thus Treasury I proposed that depreciation
allowances be based on the best available estimates of economic depreci-
ation and that the preferential taxation of capital gains be eliminated.
Moreover, like the two major Congressional contenders in the tax reform
arena (the Bradley-Gephardt and Kemp-Kasten proposals), it proposed
repeal of the investment tax credit, which, in combination with ACRS,
produces negative effective tax rates on income from investment in
equipment at current levels of inflation. In present value terms the real
value of depreciation allowances would be roughly as great for most
types of assets under RCRS (the real cost recovery system proposed in
Treasury I) as under ACRS (but not as generous as the combination of
ACRS and the ITC) at rates of inflation of roughly 5 to 6 percent or
higher.
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Inflation adjustment of interest income and expense is arguably the
most important of the proposals for dealing explicitly with inflation. The
failure to index interest has. pervasive and pernicious effects in under-
mining the equity and neutrality of the tax system. Moreover, current
law contains no ad hoc surrogates for the inflation adjustment of inter-
est, as it does for capital gains, depreciation allowances, and cost of
goods sold from inventories. Nevertheless, interest indexing was not
included in the President’s proposals, because it would increase the
complexity of taxpayer compliance, cause a loss of revenue,~2 and (as
proposed in Treasury I) provide a windfall for financial institutions (by
exempting a portion of their "spread" from tax). Unfortunately, few non-
economists realized how crucial interest indexing is to the uniform and
consistent taxation of all income. 13
Depreciation allowances. While retaining the provision for inflation
adjustment for depreciation, the President’s proposals also provided for
acceleration of such allowances. But they did so in a way that would be
relatively neutral, since the effective tax rate on income from equipment
would be uniform across assets--and slightly below that on income
from structures. 14
Aside from the obvious political pressures to do so, there are com-
pelling economic reasons for providing more generous depreciation
allowances than under Treasury I. Owner-occupied housing, as noted
above, is taxed at negative effective tax rates. Thus resource allocation
may actually be made worse by taxing income from all other sources at
effective rates approaching the statutory rates. But it is important to
recognize that once one retreats from the anchor of economic depreci-
ation, opportunities for tax shelters and tax planning--and the distor-
tions and inequities they entail--reappear.
Capital gains. The Treasury I decision to eliminate the partial exclu-
sion of long-term capital gains was based in substantial part on the
desire for simplification. Much of the tax code is devoted to the distinc-
tion between long-term capital gains and ordinary income, and much
tax planning and tax shelter activity involves the recharacterization of
ordinary income as capital gains. Eliminating this distinction would
therefore greatly simplify the tax law and reduce the latitude for tax
12Some economists realized, however, that by inducing a drop in interest rates, index-
ing would result in an even greater saving in interest on the national debt.
13As proposed, interest indexing did contain a major flaw: it did not extend to interest
on mortgages on the principal residence of a taxpayer. Hendershott (1985) has empha-
sized the misallocation that could result from this omission, particularly at high rates of
inflation. In principle--if not in political reality--this defect could easily be remedied. See
also McLure (1985b).
14This slight preference for investment in equipment, relative to structures, was moti-
vated by the belief that any externalities from investment were likely to be greater for
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planning based on the distinction between long-term capital gains and
ordinary income.
It was recognized from the outset that eliminating the preferential
treatment of long-term capital gains could have potentially adverse ef-
fects on innovation, entrepreneurship, the supply of venture capital,
general capital formation, and economic growth, even if inflation adjust-
ment assured that only real gains were subject to tax. For most "vanilla"
investments, those that do not yield extraordinarily high returns, the
combination of inflation adjustment and taxation of gains as ordinary
income would be as favorable as the current law’s exclusion of 60 per-
cent of nominal gains, except at very low rates of inflation. The more
compelling case for preferential treatment involves entrepreneurs--and
perhaps suppliers of venture capital--who have little basis in an activity
that becomes highly profitable. For them, inflation adjustment would
not compensate for the loss of the partial exclusion of current law, and
some preferential treatment may be justified on externality grounds. In
the preparation of the President’s proposals, an attempt was made to
devise a scheme that would allow preferential treatment only for gains
realized on the sale of corporate shares in new ventures, but this was
ultimately abandoned as administratively infeasible, in favor of continu-
ation of a general preference for all long-term capital gains.
Dividend Relief
The deduction of one-half of dividends paid, proposed in Treasury I,
was intended to reduce the discrimination against income from corpo-
rate equities. That, in turn, would reduce the disincentives for equity
financing relative to debt financing, increase the attractiveness of new
issues of shares relative to retained earnings, and reduce discrimination
against products of the corporate sector. The deduction would be avail-
able only for dividends paid out of fully taxed income, but under Trea-
sury I that constraint generally would not be a serious one, since most
corporate income would be taxable.
The Treasury I proposal broke with common international practice
in that it called for a dividend-paid deduction, rather than a shareholder
credit, as the vehicle for dividend relief.15 The shareholder credit or
imputation system is commonly preferred because under international
convention the credit can be withheld from foreign shareholders with-
1Sin the formulation of Treasury I, considerable attention was devoted to allowing a
deduction only for dividends paid on new issues of stock, along the lines of the proposal
in the ALI report on subchapter C. (See Andrews, 1984.) Such an approach would have
the allocative advantages of allowing relief for all dividends, but at only a fraction of the
cost; moreover; it would avoid bestowing windfall gains on owners of existing shares.44 Charles E. McLure, Jr.
out violating tax treaties. By comparison, levying an equivalent with-
holding tax on dividends paid to foreigners would violate such treaties.
In addition, nonprofit organizations would automatically benefit from
the dividend-paid deduction, whereas under the shareholder credit ap-
proach such organizations would not benefit, in the absence of refunds.
The treatment of dividends under Treasury I (and the President’s
proposals) was predicated on a desire to extend the benefits of dividend
relief to both foreign shareholders and tax-exempt organizations in order
to create equality in the tax treatment of debt and equity investments.
Given the large number of IRAs, Keogh plans, etc., that are tax-exempt
and potential claimants for refunds, the dividend-paid deduction is
clearly the simpler approach. There is an expectation that treaty partners
who have imputation systems will extend their benefits to U.S. share-
holders, not that the United States will impose a withholding tax in
order to deny the benefits of dividend relief to foreign shareholders.
Oil and Gas
Under Treasury I the oil and gas and other extractive industries
would be taxed on economic income, like other sectors of the economy.
This would be done by 1) repealing the option to use percentage deple-
tion and 2) eliminating the provisions that allow immediate expensing of
intangible drilling costs (IDCs) by independents. Thus all costs of creat-
ing an asset would be capitalized and written off through either depreci-
ation or cost depletion. As with other provisions in Treasury I, these
proposals were motivated by a concern for equity, economic neutrality,
and simplification, as well as rate reduction. The President’s proposals
would retain current-law treatment of intangible drilling costs, ostensi-
bly on the grounds of national security, but would tighten the treatment
of IDCs under the minimum tax.
The Administration position on IDCs is among the most damaging
to the case for tax reform. First, retaining expensing of IDCs has a high
cost in terms of both horizontal and vertical equity, neutrality, and sim-
plification (because it would leave intact an important vehicle for tax
shelters). Moreover, failure to deal adequately with this highly visible
and symbolic issue has caused many to doubt the commitment of the
Administration to meaningful tax reform. The appeal to national de-
fense-and, implicitly, to energy independence--is not compelling.
One can only wonder how much more nearly independent of foreign
suppliers the United States would now be if it had not previously accept-
ed national defense arguments for such misguided policies as import
quotas, percentage depletion, and expensing of intangible drilling costs,
which are designed to "pump America dry first."THETREASURY PROPOSALS 45
Minimum Tax
The tax base under Treasury I would have approximated economic
income closely enough that a minimum tax would not be needed. By
comparison, the President’s proposals retain many forms of preferential
tax treatment: for example, for the oil and gas and other extractive indus-
tries; for investment in depreciable assets; and for long-term capital
gains. This being the case, it was thought necessary to retain a minimum
tax for both corporations and individuals.
The minimum tax is evidence of a schizophrenic view of tax prefer-
ences. On the one hand, preferences are retained, presumably because
of some overriding social reason not to tax all income uniformly and
consistently. But there is strong resistance to allowing any one taxpayer
to make too much use of tax preferences, and thereby eliminate (or
almost eliminate) tax liability, no matter how justified the individual
preferences may appear to be. The policy problem, thus, is to decide
how much use of tax preferences is too much.
The minimum tax in the President’s proposals would add an impor-
tant new wrinkle to the existing structure, aside from tightening the tax
treatment of intangible drilling costs and subjecting to minimum tax the
difference between basis and m~rket value in the case of charitable gifts
of appreciated property. This is the proposal to apply the minimum tax
to 20 percent of interest expense, to the extent that depreciation is accel-
erated (as measured by the excess of depreciation allowances over those
under RCRS). The idea behind this proposal is that while accelerated
depreciation is a legitimate preference designed to stimulate investment,
combining it with debt financing goes too far, in the sense of increasing
the likelihood of negative effective rates and the ability to pay no tax.
The "Windfall Recapture" Tax
The President’s proposals included a novel provision not found in
Treasury I or, indeed, in any prior legislative proposal for tax reform, the
so-called "windfall recapture" tax. The rationale for the recapture tax is
relatively straightforward. Those who have taken advantage of acceler-
ated depreciation under current law have accumulated substantial "de-
ferred tax accounts" which will be reversed or "unwound" once assets
pass the "break-even point" at which depreciation for tax purposes no
longer exceeds book depreciation. Reduction of statutory tax rates
would create a substantial windfall; for example, for a corporation the
deferred income would be taxed at 33 percent, rather than 46 percent.
The purpose of the windfall recapture tax is simply to prevent this wind-
fall, by subjecting to tax 40 percent of income deferred via accelerated
depreciation between January 1, 1980 and the middle of 1986.46 Charles E. McLure, Jr.
This proposal has been criticized as reneging on the investment
incentives offered under ACRS and as an unfair capital levy. Both claims
are, in principle, unfounded. A properly constructed windfall recapture
tax would only prevent the windfall that would otherwise result from
the combination of rate reduction and prior acceleration of depreciation
allowances. The Administration proposal can be faulted only for using
an exceptionally slow measure of depreciation as its benchmark (that
employed in calculating earnings and profits), for requiring repayment
of the windfall tax over a period shorter than economic depreciation
would require, and for applying to depreciation on real estate expected
to be "unwound" at capital gains rates. 16
Concluding Remarks
The proposals of Treasury I were intended to comply with a Presi-
dential mandate to design a tax system that would be fair, economically
neutral, simple, and conducive to economic growth.17 As such, they
generally were mutually consistent and had internal integrity. By com-
parison, current law is a collection of provisions for capriciously prefer-
ential and punitive taxation of various sources and uses of income; not
surprisingly, it lacks consistency and integrity. 18
The President’s proposals lie somewhere between current law and
Treasury I. There are far fewer deviations from uniform and consistent
taxation than current law, but more than in Treasury I. Adoption of the
President’s proposals would represent fundamental reform in several
respects--markedly lower rates, elimination of the deduction for state
and local taxes, a foot in the door on the taxation of health care, elimina-
tion of percentage depletion, and so forth. But the plan would fall quite
short of Treasury I in several important respects--a uniform and consis-
16For more on this, see Stretch and Sunley (1985) and Aaron (1985).
17Actually, the President did not mention economic neutrality in his 1984 State of the
Union Address. But in 1981 he used the following words that are totally consistent with
the neutrality objective:
The taxing power of government must be used to provide revenues for legitimate
government purposes. It must not be used to regulate the economy or bring about
social change. (President Ronald Reagan, to a Joint Session of Congress on the Pro-
gram for Economic Recovery, February 18, 1981.)
lsI sometimes employ the following analogy: Treasury I would have produced a tax
law that is basically "round," albeit with a few lumps and bulges (resulting, for example,
from retention of preferential treatment of owner-occupied housing and municipal securi-
ties). By comparison, current law resembles a bag full of balls, boxes, and sticks; rather
than being round, it is nothing but a collection of bumps, lumps, and bulges. Needless to
say, converting the current system to the model of Treasury I would require fundamental
reform, as the President recognized in issuing his January 1984 mandate to the Treasury
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tent definition of income, including especially fringe benefits; compre-
hensive inflation adjustment; economic depreciation; taxation of capital
gains as ordinary income; elimination of expensing for intangible drill-
ing costs; no need for a minimum tax.
There may have never been much hope that Treasury I would be
adopted in its entirety. It may have been too comprehensive for the
American political system to swallow, even if advocated by a strong and
popular president. Whether the President’s less ambitious proposals,
which were born in political compromise, will fare any better remains to
be seen. Early evidence suggests that any change in the tax system that
emerges from the political process may bear even less resemblance to
fundamental tax reform.
One hopes that Treasury I has changed the nature and level of de-
bate on tax reform, both here and elsewhere, as well as perhaps provid-
ing a menu for piecemeal adoption. After the publication of Treasury I,
questions such as these were being debated as seldom before: Should
we use the tax system to implement social and industrial policy? Can the
playing field be truly level so long as owner-occupied housing retains its
uniquely favorable tax treatment? Does it make sense to accelerate de-
preciation allowances without making compensating changes in the tax
treatment of interest expense? Should we adopt inflation adjustment,
refuse to do so and risk a repeat of the experience of the 1970s, or avoid
this choice by moving to a tax system based on cash flow? What will
happen in international markets if we tax all income uniformly and con-
sistently? What are the economic effects of moving to a more neutral tax
system? Should we move as quickly as proposed, even if the proposals
make sense, or should we go more slowly? It is to be hoped that eco-
nomic research and conferences such as this will help to provide some of
the answe.rs to these and similar questions and contribute to the eventu-
al adoption of truly fundamental tax reform.48 Charles E. McLure, Jr.
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Henry I. Aaron*
My comments on Charles McLure’s paper are divided into three
parts. I begin by underscoring a number of points he makes that are
particularly praiseworthy--which in plain language means I agree with
him. Then I turn to a few points with which I disagree. Finally, I address
the choice Treasury made between trying to move toward a personal
income tax or nearer to a cash-flow tax.
Praiseworthy Points
McLure lays great stress on the distinction between two kinds of tax
simplification. The first kind makes the tax form short and simple. The
second kind results when tax rules are changed to reduce incentives to
engage in transactions motivated by the desire to avoid taxes. The first
form of simplification makes life easier for the day or so per year most of
us spend preparing our taxes. The second form of simplification makes
our life easier 365 days a year by freeing us from the need to take taxes
into account in making economic decisions. Although most people want
their own forms to be simple (the first kind of simplification), many also
want other people not to be able to engage in tax avoidance transactions,
even socially meritorious ones (the second kind of simplification).
McLure stresses that since tax avoidance by others reduces taxpayer
morale, the case for the second kind of simplification is enhanced.
Sometimes these two kinds of simplification reinforce one an-
other--elimination of the distinction between long-term and short-term
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capital gains, for example. But sometimes they are in sharp conflict~the
Treasury’s proposals to index interest, for example. The admitted addi-
tion to complexity on the tax form that this provision would have en-
tailed would have been more than offset by the transactional simplifica-
tion that could have been achieved. The decision to drop this proposal,
allegedly because of its complexity, is especially regrettable, ironically
because that decision sacrificed one of the great opportunities for simpli-
fication.
McLure correctly bewails the untouchability of the mortgage inter-
est deduction. The failure--necessary, perhaps, but no less regrettable
for that reason--to include owner-occupied housing in the reform was,
as McLure in effect acknowledges, the Achilles’ heel of the proposed
changes in capital income taxation. The step-by-step dismantling of
Treasury I’s indexing proposals, first at the hand of Treasury in fashion-
ing the President’s proposal; then by Treasury in response to the de-
mands of the Ways and Means Committee that the President’s plan
should not lose revenue; and now, it would appear, at the hands of the
Ways and Means Committee, is the major disappointment in the evolu-
tion of the tax reform proposal.
McLure reserves his strongest language for the reversal of Treasury I’s
proposal to repeal expensing of intangible drilling costs, to which I can
only say, "Amen." As obiter dicta he also joins all sane economists in
warning of the dangers of the deficit, and he links armswith the over-
whelming majority of economists, who doubt that spending cuts will
eliminate the deficit, in calling for a tax increase "the sooner the better,"
as McLure puts it, which I believe is at least a few minutes sooner than
"as a last resort."
Finally, McLure says exactly the right things, in my view, about
fringe benefits, charitable contributions, capital income taxation, double
taxation of dividends, and the windfall tax.
Points Requiring Further Discussion
In a few areas, I believe, McLure has not stated the issues correctly.
His criticism of the minimum tax is so muted that it sounds as if the
minimum tax is simply Congress’s way of never having to say "I’m
sorry" for enacting a tax preference--a device for telling taxpayers that it
likes them to do certain things that avoid tax, but only if they don’t avoid
too much tax. McLure does not emphasize what an administrative
nightmare a minimum tax is, particularly one that would yield any sig-
nificant amount of revenue. Moreover, if marginal tax rates really do
influence behavior, the minimum tax would vastly complicate private
decisions. Effective marginal rates associated with one transactionDISCUSSION 51
would depend not only on the volume of that type of transaction, but
also on the volume of other transactions that generate preference in-
come or that influence the limit on preference income before minimum
tax triggers in. This way lies insanity.
The section on deductibility of state and local taxes is marred, in my
opinion, by serious overstatement and imprecision. McLure states:
"State and local taxes are spent largely to provide services that benefit
those who pay the taxes. As a result, there is little more reason that they
should be deductible than there is that other (private) consumption ex-
penditures should be tax-preferred."
This statement is surely false, or it condemns virtually all grants-in-
aid. In 1982, 35.6 percent of state and local spending was devoted to
education, 9.3 percent to health and hospitals, and 13 percent to public
welfare. The preceding quotation from McLure’s paper would suggest
that the benefits from each of these outlays stop abruptly at the edge of
the jurisdiction that pays for them or, alternatively, that the current
system of grants correctly compensates for spillovers. Thus, the benefits
of education (for which there are virtually no federal grants-in-aid), the
preceding quotation would suggest, stop abruptly at the edge of the
jurisdiction that pays for them. In Massachusetts, for example, this quo-
tation would suggest that the benefits of education extend for the most
part only to the city line, not to other cities in the state, because munici-
palities bear most of the cost of education in Massachusetts. In Georgia,
however, the benefits of education are mostly statewide, because that
state pays most of the cost of education. In neither case, however, do
any of the benefits of education accrue to people who reside in other
states, because they pay nothing for them. Or at least they wouldn’t if
the deduction of state and local taxes were repealed.
I submit that this way of looking at the interconnectedness of citi-
zens in the contemporary United States is an anachronism, a throwback
to a country not linked by jets, televisions, and computers, to a country
that had not yet fully achieved nationhood, to a nation in which a citizen
might well describe himself first as, say, a Virginian and second as an
American. It is a deification of the human instrumentality of state and
municipal boundaries to suggest that I am less affected by the education
policies of Bethesda, Maryland because I live in Washington, D.C. than I
would be if I lived in Baltimore. Is Charles McLure less affected by edu-
cation policies in the District of Columbia than by those in San Diego?
Would citizens of Houston, Texas be less influenced by health policy in
E1 Paso than they are now if Texas exercised its constitutionally guaran-
teed right to split into five states? Are citizens of Chicago less influenced
by education policies in Gary, Indiana, 20 miles away, than they are by
what is done in Cairo, Illinois, 370 miles away?52 Henry J. Aaron
I hope that you will agree that the answer to all of the preceding
questions is "no" and that the questions are not even close. I will tell you
that I receive no more direct benefits from the District of Columbia Hos-
pital, which mostly serves low-income people and for the support of
which I willingly pay income and property taxes, than I receive from Los
Angeles County Hospital, which serves a similar clientele and for which
I directly pay nothing. The deductibility of state and local taxes is one
device for recognizing that commonality of interest, not the best possible
one by a long shot, but not one I would willingly abandon completely
until the medicaid program or something like it is vastly improved and
extended. If these questions have any force, then the rationale for re-
pealing deductibility of state and local taxes cannot be based on
McLure’s contentions.
There is a rationale for viewing deductibility with a good deal of
suspicion. But the resulting question is close. As McLure later correctly
states, "the deduction for state and local taxes is an extremely blunt
instrument for [he then adds, incorrectly in my view] the encourage-
ment of the relatively small portion of subnational expenditures that do
have important spillovers at the margin." He praises targeted grants as
more appropriate in offsetting spillovers.
I couldn’t agree more. Had the current Administration succeeded in
instituting such a grant system, its case for repeal of deductibility would
be overwhelming. Instead, they scaled back the imperfect system we
had, notably in the field of education, and they have significantly cur-
tailed the liberality of health grants. The relevant question today is not
whether deductibility is inferior to a well-conceived program of match-
ing grants; everyone here would agree that it is. Rather, the question is
whether, given the highly flawed and shrinking system of grants we
have, deductibility helps marginally in dealing with spillovers. Crude
though it is, deductibility is in my judgment better than nothing. Its
crudity argues for curtailment, perhaps along the lines of the compro-
mise proposed by the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee.
Deductibility certainly does needlessly encourage citizens in some
bedroom communities to have too many or excessively lavish municipal
swimming pools. But we insufficiently encourage citizens of Worcester
or Wilkes-Barre or Jersey City or rural counties in Arkansas to educate
their children well or to provide good health care to the indigent. Repeal-
ing deductibility of state and local taxes will solve the swimming pool
problem, but, in the absence of a well-developed system of grants, it will
make the education and health problems worse. Is that a good trade? In
short, whose spillovers are McLure and a good many other economists
talking about? Those of a nation in which news and people took days or
weeks to get from one place to another? Or those of a nation in which
spillovers mock a geographer’s boundaries?DISCUSSION 53
Income or Cash-Flow Tax?
McLure describes the way in which Treasury made an early decision
to stick with the annual income tax, rather than take the great leap to a
cash-flow tax. From a political standpoint I think the Administration
made the right decision, despite the growing consensus among econo-
mists that a cash-flow tax--either of the consumption type or of the
lifetime income type---has important advantages over the annual in-
come tax. The selling job required to win acceptance of a cash-flow tax
would have been even more formidable than that needed to pass what
was actually proposed. And the burden of that selling job, as we are
now observing, may well be more than our political leaders can
shoulder.
But the reasons McLure states for rejecting the cash-flow tax are
really not very strong. The Treasury seems to have backed away from the
cash-flow tax with all the reluctance of an anorexic told to skip dessert.
McLure classifies the problems of a cash-flow tax in three categories:
transition, international issues, and bequests. In each case, he says,
there were apparently unsolvable problems that were sufficiently serious
to stop the show. But he doesn’t present any.
The principal transitional problem is how to avoid double taxation
of old wealth acquired out of taxed income. A simple cash-flow tax
would impose yet another tax when, and if, the wealth is spent. McLure
states that it would not be a simple matter to formulate a workable
transition provision. He is right that it is difficult, but misleading, I
think, in suggesting that it is not possible. Harvey Galper and I devel-
oped a transitional rule that I believe avoids this problem and requires
no more recordkeeping than does the current tax on long-term capital
gains. I won’t deny that we are clever fellows, but so are McLure’s for-
mer colleagues at Treasury. Where there’s a will ....
International problems take two forms, international tax relations
and tax evasion. McLure states that adoption of a cash-flow tax would
require renegotiation of all tax treaties. Maybe so, but some of the lead-
ing tax lawyers in Washington disagree. They suggest that although
problems of policy in the United States will be numerous, there would
be few treaty obstacles to a new personal and corporate income tax in
which income is defined on a cash-flow basis. Before any of us take as
gospel the contention that a switch to a cash-flow tax would be a
Sisyphean diplomatic labor, we should insist on being shown chapter
and verse.
The other international problem is evasion. Proceeds of foreign
loans could be deposited as "saving" in the United States. That is a
problem, a problem of fraud, and enforcement resources would have to
be devoted to minimizing it. But so are fraudulent tax shelters. So, in
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tax-exempt securities. And the diversion of income through tax-haven
countries, while often avoidance rather than evasion, reflects the fact
that we have responded to many problems under the current income tax
by legalizing avoidance, rather than persisting in quixotic attempts to
stop it. Thus, we enact provisions to promote saving, such as IRAs and
401ks, and then blink at the current deduction of interest expense on
loans while interest on these and other accumulations is exempt. In
short, the current tax system, and even the one that would emerge after
tax reform, is suffused with what McLure calls showstoppers that are at
least as bad as the foreign borrowing problem he cites. Better, it would
seem, the showstoppers you know--the practices that you know you
can’t do anything about and have therefore legalized--than the show-
stoppers you don’t know. My point is a simple one--the current tax
system is suffused with provisions that would be regarded, properly, as
showstoppers in a proposal for reform.
On the subject of bequests, I have more sympathy with McLure’s
objections to cash-flow taxes. Most cash-flow taxes are of the consump-
tion variety and would increase the opportunities of taxpayers whose
taxes run to dynastic accumulation to indulge their particular form of
consumption. McLure expresses concern that if such propensities were
unhindered by some tax on unconsumed income, excessive concentra-
tions of wealth would be likely to result. Such concentrations could be
limited by a serious attempt to tax gifts and bequests. Not all intergener-
ational transfers could be subjected to tax, but we would get most of the
large ones if we were willing to go to some administrative trouble. The
will is conspicuously lacking, and McLure doesn’t want to risk losing the
tax we now have on unconsumed income. Given that perspective, his
support for raising additional revenue from a value-added tax, rather
than from higher taxes on personal income, seems a bit inconsistent. His
concern should push him in the direction that Harvey Galper and I have
taken, support of a cash-flow tax that treats gifts and bequests, like
consumption, as a taxable use of resources. As soon as the detached
climate of Stanford has permitted him to shed the regrettable Washing-
ton habit of abandoning good ideas because they aren’t immediately
saleable, I hope that he will join us.Discussion
John B. Shoven*
Charles McLure is to be congratulated for his role as the chief archi-
tect of a truly fundamental tax reform proposal. No previous proposal
for comprehensive reform, not even the ambitious Blueprints For Basic
Tax Reform (1977), has had to come to grips with all of the details which
must be dealt with in order for a plan to be realistically considered for
implementation. Treasury I has been scrutinized by the press, by lobby-
ists, and by all sorts of analysts. It is remarkable how far it has gotten, or,
perhaps more accurately, what it has started. Clearly this is the proposal
that got tax reform moving in this country, and it still is providing the
outline for much of the debate. My role as a discussant is to evaluate the
paper, which in this case amounts to evaluating the proposal. It is easy
to fault the proposal on certain particulars, and I will do so, but let me be
clear that I believe it would have been difficult to build a superior com-
prehensive plan.
The first issue I will mention with respect to Treasury I is the choice
of a tax base. The proposal aims to tax a comprehensive measure of real
economic income. In making this choice, it is somewhat old-fashioned.
The tax base favored by most academic public finance economists today
is expenditure. The expenditure tax is touted as having at least three
advantages. First, the philosophy of taxing people according to their
withdrawals from the social product (i.e., consumption) rather than the
value of their contribution to it (income) is attractive. Second, an expen-
diture-based tax system would not distort the choice between saving
and consumption in that it would offer investors the full return on their
investments. This may indicate that the economy would allocate re-
sources more efficiently with an expenditure tax than with an income
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tax. The analytical and simulation work in this area tends to support this
efficiency advantage of the expenditure tax. Third, a tax based on expen-
diture can avoid the complicated issues of defining real capital income
and adjusting the tax base for inflation. Thus, it holds out the promise of
a considerably simpler tax system. These advantages have been asserted
in numerous academic articles and were clearly presented in Blueprints
for Basic Tax Reform.
Treasury I and Charles McLure in his paper state that the transition
issues in a switch to an expenditure tax may be such that the whole
thing is undesirable. Further, McLure is concerned about the possibility
that some "showstopper" would crop up in the implementation of an
expenditure tax which would stop tax reform in its tracks. The problems
were not presented in detail, and it strikes me that if a proposal that
public finance economists have been pushing for the last 10 years suffers
from some fatal flaws, then the defects should be fully analyzed.
One can overstate the degree to which Treasury I was pure with
respect to the income tax concept. While it attempts to tax real corporate
income, it leaves the personal tax base far from true economic income. It
makes no attempt to include the imputed income from owner-occupied
housing, and it proposes an expansion of Individual Retirement Ac-
counts. These features are consistent with expenditure taxation, not in-
come taxation. Despite this, the direction in which Treasury I tries to go
is clear, and it is towards an income tax.
Before going further, I want to register my complaint about the
constraints which were imposed on the Treasury Department in the de-
sign of its tax reform proposal. First, it was to be revenue neutral. While
I cannot claim to be certain of the consequences of running deficits as
large as we are, it seems irresponsible to me to rule out a tax increase as a
means of reducing the deficit. Even ignoring the connections between
our fiscal posture and the dollar’s strength and the foreign trade deficit,
it should be made clear by our profession that the choice is not between
high taxes and low taxes, but between higher taxes now and higher
taxes in the future. If we continue to accumulate debt at the current rate,
a tax increase will ultimately be necessary just to service our increasingly
foreign-held obligations. Second, I thought it was ironic that the same
document that pointed out the many tax shelters and legal abuses avail-
able to the wealthy would also claim that distributional neutrality was
virtue. The current distribution of tax burdens by income class is, after
all, partially a product of those very same abuses. Charles McLure, of
course, cannot be criticized for playing by the rules, but I hope it is
within bounds for me to complain about them.
Treasury I gets mixed marks when it comes to the treatment of
capital income. The proposal to partially integrate the corporate and
personal income tax systems by allowing corporations to deduct 50 per-DISCUSSION 57
cent of dividends paid should have received loud applause. This is a
direction of reform which public finance economists such as Shoup,
Musgrave, and Pechman have been advocating for years. Business was
slow to endorse this feature of the plan, perhaps because of manage-
ment fears of pressures to pay out a larger share of earnings, and there-
fore it has been scrapped in the political compromises of the last year.
The strong point of Treasury I regarding capital formation is that it
proposes roughly equal taxation of different types of investment assets.
Equipment, plant, land, and inventories would face very similar effec-
tive tax rates. This is in sharp contrast to the situation under the current
law, where most studies show that equipment is strongly favored. How-
ever, neutrality between corporate investments does not imply that Trea-
sury I is completely neutral in the treatment of all investments, or even
that it is more neutral than the current law or Treasury II, the President’s
tax proposals.
One large problem is the failure to tax owner-occupied housing,
which constitutes a very significant portion of the nation’s capital stock.
The point is that treating all corporate investments equally is not neces-
sarily desirable if residential real estate is going to escape taxation alto-
gether. The paper, in my opinion, is wrong in suggesting that removing
the deductibility of mortgage interest would have been an improve-
ment. The problem with the treatment of housing, at least from an in-
come tax perspective, is not the deductibility of mortgage interest but
the fact that the economic income flow is untaxed. Disallowing mort-
gage interest deductions would just create a new distortion between
people who have large mortgages and those who are able to accumulate
a large equity position in their homes. If one can use his own funds to
acquire a house, then the implicit interest would still remain free of tax,
even in a situation where mortgage interest had been declared not de-
ductible. Only mortgaged homeowners would face a higher cost for
housing investments. If it is decided that it is impossible for practical
purposes to tax the imputed income of homeowners, then the rest of the
design of the tax system should take account of this fact. That might
imply that renters should be given tax breaks to put them on a more
even footing, and might argue that corporate investments should be
lightly taxed so that they can compete on more even terms with housing
for funds.
If we look at neutrality in terms of the intertemporal allocation of
resources, it is not clear that Treasury I looks good. This, of course, is the
natural consequence of judging an income tax proposal on expenditure
tax criteria. Using a cost of capital approach in the Hall-Jorgenson tradi-
tion, King and Fullerton (1984) found that the total wedge between what
an investment earns and what the investor receives amounted to rough-
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personal income taxes, and takes account of the investment tax credit
and depreciation and inventory accounting. In two subsequent articles,
Fullerton (1985) and Fullerton and Henderson (1984) found that the
ERTA bill in 1981 reduced the wedge between investment and investor
to 23.6 percent. However, 1982’s TEFRA bill increased the wedge to 30
percent and Treasury I would have brought it up to 43 percent. The
President’s tax proposals of May 1985 would have imposed a tax wedge
on investments in the corporate sector of 35 percent, exactly where it
was before the Reagan administration took office. The plan currently
being considered in Congress probably imposes a wedge somewhere
between that of Treasury I and Treasury II. Certainly the Administration
and the country seem to have completely changed direction on the tax-
ation of capital income. It might be valuable to note that Shoven and
Tachibanaki (1985) used the same methodology and computed the
wedge faced by Japanese investors. While the results were different for
different years, the figures ranged from 7 to 20 percent, or substantially
less than the wedge faced by American investors.
There has been some false advertisement of both the Treasury I and
the Treasury II plans. Most blatant are the tables and statements assert-
ing that 75 to 80 percent of households would be better off under the
proposed tax plans. These figures are the result of plans that reduce
individual taxes and raise corporate taxes and the fact that Treasury did
not attribute the taxes that corporations pay to individuals. This ignores
the most fundamental rule of tax incidence, namely that someone must
bear the burden of all taxes. I also feel that the Treasury should not get
credit for the rate reductions that it achieves by making state and local
taxes non-deductible. The effect of eliminating the deductibility of state
and local taxes is to increase the burden of the state-supplied public
goods. The effective marginal tax rate faced by households is not re-
duced by what amounts to a change in the level of government that is
collecting the tax. Finally, in the area of false advertising, the Adminis-
tration acts as if removing those with below poverty level income from
the tax rolls is the ultimate generosity. Of course, in earlier times such
programs as negative income taxes and cashable credits have been con-
sidered, and they would have done far more than the plans now being
considered for the poor.
Let me conclude by evaluating Treasury I on the three standards in
its title: fairness, growth, and simplicity. In taxing a broader range of
incomes symmetrically and in closing down many unproductive tax
shelters, Treasury I greatly improves horizontal equity. It deserves high
marks in the area of fairness. In terms of promoting growth, the case that
it would improve the situation is not compelling. While different corpo-
rate investments would be taxed more similarly, this is achieved at a
higher tax rate which puts them at an even greater disadvantage relativeDISCUSSION 59
to owner-occupied housing. The whole reform process began with the
goal of simplifying the tax system. Here, too, I think less was achieved
than claimed. The fact is that taxing real economic income is inherently
complicated, and the inflation adjustments that Treasury I makes are not
simple. In fact, I think it is largely their complexity which has caused them
to gradually disappear from the plans that have followed Treasury I.
Despite those shortcomings, Treasury I was a major accomplish-
ment. It was a detailed proposal to tax real income in a fair manner. It is
the only proposal which got serious about adjusting the definition of
income for inflation, and it did eliminate the unevenness in the tax
treatment of different corporate investments. And, it really went after
abusive tax shelters which threaten to undermine the public’s confi-
dence in the tax system. These are considerable accomplishments, in-
deed. Treasury I will long be considered a landmark event in the history
of tax reform in the United States.
Bradford, David F., and the U.S. Treasury Tax Policy Staff. Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform.
Tax Analysts: Arlington, Virginia (Second Edition, Revised), 1984.
Fullerton, Don. "The Indexation of Interest, Depreciation, and Capital Gains: A Model of
Investment Incentives," National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper
#1655, June 1985.
Fullerton, Don, and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson. "Incentive Effects of Taxes on Income
from Capital: Alternative Policies in the 1980s," National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Working paper #1262, January 1984.
King, M.A., and Don Fullerton. The Taxation of Income from Capital: A Co~nparative Study of
the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and West Germany, The University of
Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 1984.
McLure, Charles E., Jr. ’~The Rationale for Treasury-I," Paper prepared for the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston Conference on the Economic Consequences of Tax Simplifica-
tion, Melvin Village, New Hampshire, October 2-4, 1985.
Shoven, John B., and Toshiaki Tachibaniki. "The Taxation of Income from Capital in Ja-
pan." Paper presented at the Center for Economic Policy Research Conference on
Government Policy Towards Industry in the United States and Japan, May 2-3, 1985,
Stanford, California and at the "U.S.-Japan Productivity Conference" of the NBER’s
Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, August 26-28, 1985, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
U.S. Treasury Department, Office of the Secretary. Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and
Economic Growth: The Treasury Depart,nent Report to the President (volumes 1-3), Novem-
ber 1984.Discussion
Emil M. Sunley*
Charles McLure focuses on the Treasury tax plan submitted to the
President in November 1984 (Treasury I) and the President’s tax reform
proposals announced last May (Treasury II). The broad outlines of the
two proposals are similar. Both retain the income tax as the major source
of federal tax revenue. Both shift the income tax toward corporations
and away from individuals. Both would raise roughly the same amount
of revenue as current law. Both include a top marginal rate of 35 percent
for individuals and 33 percent for corporations.
Once one gets beyond these major similarities, Treasury II, as
McLure concludes, is but a shadow of Treasury I. The original Treasury
plan will remain a standard for comparing proposals for comprehensive
income tax reform. The profession owes Charlie a debt of gratitude for
his critical role in formulating Treasury I.
Let me comment on three issues.
Distributional Neutrality
Treasury I was designed to be roughly distributionally neutral across
income classes, except that the lowest income class gets a larger reduc-
tion when measured as a percentage reduction in tax. Treasury II pro-
vides the largest percentage reductions at both the bottom end and the
top end of the income scale.
But is the percentage reduction in tax the best standard for distribu-
tional neutrality? One might want to look at the percentage change in
after-tax income. Using this standard, one concludes that the tax pro-
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gram tilts dramatically toward families and individuals with higher in-
comes. However, if one also considers the distributional impact of the
increase in corporate taxes, higher income families and individuals do
not come out all that well.
Capital Gains
Treasury I would have taxed capital gains in full while permitting
the basis of the asset to be adjusted for inflation. Treasury II abandons
this approach.1 Instead, the exclusion for net long-term capital gains
would be reduced from 60 percent to 50 percent. Some tax reformers
have criticized Treasury II as being only a one-sixth cutback in the prefer-
ence for capital gains. This is not the appropriate way to judge the cap-
ital gains proposal. Under current law, a taxpayer in the 50 percent tax
bracket gets to keep at the margin 50 cents of each dollar of ordinary
income and 80 cents of each dollar of capital gains. Thus if income is
characterized as capital gains instead of ordinary income, the amount of
after-tax income is 60 percent greater. Under Treasury II, if the income is
characterized as ordinary income the taxpayer keeps 65 cents on the
dollar, given the proposed 35 percent top marginal rate. If the income is
characterized as capital gains, the taxpayer would keep 82.5 cents, or 27
percent more. The incentive to convert ordinary income into capital
gains is cut by more than half, even though the exclusion is cut by only
one-sixth.
Indexing for Inflation
Treasury I included proposals for comprehensive indexing of the tax
system for inflation. Capital gains, inventories, depreciation and debt
would all have been indexed.
Treasury I had a shortcut approach for indexing debt. Instead of
indexing each debt instrument, a portion of net interest paid would not
be deductible and a portion of net interest received would be excluded
from taxable income. The portion depends on the rate of inflation and
on an assumption that the real before-tax rate of return is 6 percent. If
inflation is 5 percent, then the portion would be 5/11ths (5 divided by six
plus five). If the rate of inflation is 7 percent, then the portion is 7/13ths
(7 divided by 6 plus 7).
1Treasury II does include a proposal for full taxation of capital gains with an inflation
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This shortcut approach for indexing may work on average. But it
clearly does not work if a business both borrows and lends. Consider a
commercial bank that borrows at 10 and lends at 12, making a spread of
2. If the maturities are matched, the bank is fully protected from infla-
tion. Under Treasury I, however, the bank would be able to exclude a
portion of net interest income.
The exact approach for indexing would be to adjust both the interest
paid and the interest received. Assuming inflation is 5 percent, then
5/10ths of the interest paid should be deductible and 7/12ths of the inter-
est received should be taxable. The spread would still be 2.
This exact approach probably is too complicated and was rejected by
Treasury. Once Treasury realized that the shortcut approach did not
work in garden-variety situations, it was forced to drop the indexing of
debt.
Many would contend that it is inappropriate to index capital gains
or depreciation unless debt is also indexed. Otherwise taxpayers will
borrow to buy an asset, gaining a tax advantage from inflation. Interest
paid will be fully deductible while only a portion of the gain will be taxed
and the depreciation deductions will be magnified by inflation indexing.
This would result in an appearance of inequity.
But is it any worse than current law which permits a full deduction
for interest paid and provides ad hoc inflation adjustments for depreci-
ation and capital gains? These ad hoc inflation adjustments--accelerated
depreciation and exclusion for capital gains--may be right for some level
of inflation. They are too generous for lower rates of inflation and not
generous enough for higher rates. Indexing depreciation and capital
gains would be superior to the ad hoc adjustments even if interest paid
remained fully deductible.
Treasury II Compared to Ways and Means Proposal
McLure focuses on Treasury I and Treasury II. These proposals have
been partly passed over by events. The Ways and Means Committee has
begun marking up a tax reform bill working from a staff option devel-
oped by the Joint Committee on Taxation. This option includes many of
the proposals put forth by the President, but there are significant differ-
ences from Treasury II. Let me describe them.
First, the staff option would improve the distribution of the tax
burden. This would be accomplished by reducing the exclusion for net~
long-term capital gains to 40 percent, making the top tax rate on capital
gains 21 percent. Also, the proposed $2,000 personal exemption would
be scaled back to $1,500, reducing the tax benefits at the highest income
levels. At the same time, the standard deduction would be increased soDISCUSSION 63
that families and individuals with incomes below the poverty line would
generally not be taxed, as under Treasury II.
Second, the staff option would not repeal the itemized deduction
for state and local taxes. Instead, the staff option proposes to permit
deductions for income and real property taxes with the deduction limit-
ed to $1,000 or the excess of these taxes over 5 percent of adjusted gross
income, if greater. Though this does not sound like simplification, it may
represent the kind of compromise necessary if a tax bill is to be enacted.
Third, the staff option adopts the approach of Treasury I and places
a per employee cap on the value of employer-provided health benefits.
The cap would be $120 per month for individual coverage and $300 per
month for family coverage. Though the cap is higher than in Treasury I,
McLure would agree that the staff option establishes the correct princi-
ple, in contrast to the proposed floor in Treasury II.
Fourth, on the business side, the staff option drops the President’s
proposal for a windfall recapture tax on excess depreciation and phases
in the dividends-paid deduction. The option also drops indexing of de-
preciation and stretches out the allowable depreciation deductions for
new investment. The top corporate tax rate would be 35 percent. The
effect of these changes is to lower the tax burden on old capital and
increase the tax burden on new capital, compared to Treasury II. More-
over, on an overall basis, the staff option shifts the burden of the corpo-
rate tax more toward corporations than Treasury II.